

Canvass Activities Summary:

Auditing of the Precincts

Each Inspector is responsible to complete a variety of forms and certifications after the close of the polls on Election Day. Elections staff then audits those forms to account for all ballots issued and returned. In February 2008, there were 160 precinct boards at 108 polling places. 68 were singles, 31 were doubles, 7 were triples, 1 was a quadruple and 1 was a five-in-one. All precincts were audited and where the paperwork reflected inaccuracies, those inaccuracies were thoroughly researched and resolved. In all cases these were poll worker errors such as simple mathematical errors, transcription errors, or recording information in multiple places on the same form (i.e. counting a spoiled surrendered vote-by-mail ballot as both a spoiled ballot and a surrendered vote-by-mail ballot therefore recording it as two ballots when only one existed).

1% Manual Tally

Per Elections Code Section 15360, 1% of precincts must be hand tallied to determine that the voting system is reading and tabulating votes correctly. To determine 1% of the precincts, divide the total number of precincts including mail ballot precincts, by 100. For February 2008, there were 192 precincts, which meant that 1.92 or 2 precincts were fully counted. Additionally, one precinct was counted for each contest that was on the ballot. As such, additional precincts are randomly selected for each contest that is not included in the initial count. Santa Cruz County also has a policy of tallying a precinct from each of the supervisorial districts.

Precincts were randomly selected on February 14th at 9:15 a.m. by staff. All precincts are randomly selected by the roll of a 10-sided die. For February 2008, 7 precincts were required to catch all contest and all supervisorial districts. Five of the precincts were fully tallied (all contests) and two precincts only had the unique local measure recounted. All votes cast in those precincts were tallied including Vote-By-Mail, Precinct Ballots, and votes cast on Touchscreens. The Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT) was left intact and read using a reel-to-reel mechanism. Blank ballots that were encountered (in any media) were tallied as undervotes for each contest. Spoiled, cancelled and otherwise invalidated ballots (such as voided ballots on the VVPAT) were not tallied as they are not valid ballots.

Vote-by-mail and paper ballots used at the polling places were tallied by audit teams of between 6 and 10 auditors. All auditors were grouped around a large table. The ballots were distributed between all the auditors. Each auditor had a random selection of the ballots. First, the ballots were counted for the total number in the pile. This allowed the auditor to balance the number of votes cast (including under and overvotes) with the number of ballots in their pile. Next, one staff person was the caller. They would call the contest to be counted and go around the table asking each of the auditors for the number of ballots that they had for a given candidate or choice. Each auditor had to balance the number of votes cast to their number of ballots and the total of the votes cast for all the auditors had to match the tally

being taken. The tally is kept by a tally-keeper (one of the auditors) and is also tabulated by the caller who is keeping track using a calculator. Both the tally-keeper and the caller had to match and the total had to balance. The results were later compared to the central tally count and if the totals did not match, then the hand tally began again.

Touchscreen votes were audited by reviewing the VVPAT records. VVPAT records were audited by teams of four. One person was assigned as the reader, another person as the verifier, and the other two as tally-takers. The tally-takers kept independent tallies. The tally-takers had to match one another at random check points and at the end of the tape, they had to match one another and the results tape. Those results were then compared against the central count. If the results did not match, then the hand tally began again.

Materials used to complete the tallies were minimal, but included specialized tally sheets, reel-to-reel mechanisms, pencils, scotch tape, calculators and the central count reports.

- **1037 (only local measure tallied)**
 - Vote-By-Mail Ballots: balanced on first pass.
 - Polling Place Ballots: balanced on first pass.
 - Touchscreen Ballots: balanced on first pass.
- **1201 (all contests tallied)**
 - Vote-By-Mail Ballots: all except proposition 97 balanced on first pass. Prop 97 recounted by hand again and balanced.
 - Polling Place Ballots: Propositions 91, 92, 94, 95, 96 and 97 did not balance on the first pass. Each was recounted and balanced on the second pass.
 - Touchscreen Ballots: balanced on first pass.
- **2208 (all contests tallied)**
 - Vote-By-Mail Ballots: Democrat Presidential, Propositions 91, 92, 95, and 96 did not balance on the first pass. Each hand recounted. All except Prop 96 balanced on second pass. During the second pass, a single ballot was identified as having a voting mark that was discernible with the human eye, but the 400-C failed to read. The ballots were rerun in a test mode and confirmed this. The ballot was remarked and rerun on the 400-C for the official count. The precinct then balanced.
 - Polling Place Ballots: balanced on first pass.
 - Touchscreen Ballots: balanced on first pass.
- **3005 (only local measure tallied)**
 - Vote-By-Mail Ballots: Only the local measure was counted and it balanced on the first pass.
 - Polling Place Ballots: this was a mail ballot precinct and therefore there were no polling place ballots to count.
 - Touchscreen Ballots: this was a mail ballot precinct and therefore there were no touchscreen ballots to count from the polling places. Additionally, no votes were cast on the touchscreens at elections central or our satellite office.
- **3122 (all contests tallied)**
 - Vote-By-Mail Ballots: balanced on first pass.

- Polling Place Ballots: Propositions 92 and 94 did not balance on the first pass. These contests were recounted and balanced on the second pass.
- Touchscreen Ballots: balanced on first pass.
- **4026 (all contests tallied)**
 - Vote-By-Mail Ballots: balanced on first pass.
 - Polling Place Ballots: Propositions 92, 93 and 96 did not balance on the first pass. These contests were recounted and balanced on the second pass.
 - Touchscreen Ballots: balanced on first pass.
- **5034 (all contests tallied)**
 - Vote-By-Mail Ballots: balanced on first pass.
 - Polling Place Ballots: Propositions 93 and 94 did not balance on the first pass, but did on the second.
 - Touchscreen Ballots: balanced on first pass.

In the end, our machine tally matched the hand counts with 100% accuracy.

No observers were present during the canvass, though we welcome observers at all times. Because the audit was conducted at central elections, no additional security measures were required above and beyond normal security precautions in place.

100% Manual Tally of Votes Cast on Touchscreens

In addition to the 1% manual tally mandated by state election code, the Secretary of State mandated that 100% of all votes cast on touchscreens must be hand tallied to confirm the electronic results. Santa Cruz County had 9451 qualified votes cast on touchscreens on Election Day, February 5, 2008. 11 qualified votes were cast at the central and satellite offices with the remaining 9440 qualified votes cast at the polls.

In teams of four, each Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail was hand tallied. Duties were divided among team members with one member reading from the tape, one member verifying what was read, and the other two members keeping independent, simultaneous tallies. Periodically throughout the tape, team members would pause and compare results to ensure that the tally-takers were in sync. If they were not, they would go back to the last balance point, noted with X marks on the tally sheet and post-it notes on the tape, and begin the tally over. Once all the ballots for that machine had been read, then the totals on the tally sheets were compared against the results portion of the tape. The tallies must match. The supervisor for the 100% tally or other designated staff would then compare the tally sheets (which already balanced with the machine results printed at the polls on Election Day) to the central tally counts. This verified that the central county system was accurate reading and recording the votes from each unit. During this process, the votes from the tally sheets for the central and satellite touchscreens were added to the tally results for each corresponding precinct.

In the end, the results from the manual tally matched the machine results with 100% accuracy. However, during the review of the tapes, two interesting situations arose.

1. In precinct 2031, the printer jammed and made Proposition 97 unreadable on one ballot. Apparently the voter did not mention this to the Electronic Voting Specialist, who activated a ballot for another voter who cast a ballot that was not printed on the VVPAT since it was jammed. It was at this point Central Elections was alerted and a new printer was dispatched. This created a challenge to the manual count team. The team tallied the results as they saw them and then compared the results to the results report at the end of the tape. They knew that the vote totals would be off a full ballot and a single vote for Proposition 97. This turned out to be the case. Staff went back to the results cartridge for the precinct and extracted the audit trail. The extracted information was cut into individual ballots. As the tape was reread, a corresponding ballot from the stack was moved into a counted pile. When the jammed ballot was reached, it was skipped, flagging it on the roll. At the end of the precinct, two ballot slips remained in the uncounted pile- one that matched the missing ballot image and one that matched the partially printed ballot. When those ballots were added, the results matched with 100% accuracy.
2. Precincts 5018 and 5019 were both assigned to the Boulder Creek Fire House which is located up a minimum of 3 steps. For accessibility purposes, one touchscreen was placed at bottom of steps in an accessible location and staffed at all times. At some point during the day, one voter from 5018 voted on the 5019 machine and one voter from 5019 voted on the 5018 machine. When the manual count teams tallied the precinct tapes, the tallies matched the results tape, but failed to match the central count. Each tape was reviewed again. When the votes from the single migratory ballot were subtracted from the tape and the votes from the single opposing migratory ballot were added, the results matched the central tally and proved that the tally system was correctly accumulating votes based on the access codes input by the Electronic Voting Specialist at the polls.

Seals Audit

Each piece of voting equipment is protected under many levels of security. One level of that security is the visible seals used on the equipment both permanently and on Election Day. All visible seals were audited. Where questions arose regarding particular seals, extensive investigations were undertaken. In no case was there any break of security that endangered any votes. All instances of anomalies were traced back to poll worker or staff error such as typographical errors or not returning all the broken seals.

Equipment Incidents

Election Day went very smoothly in Santa Cruz County. 22 incidents were logged for voting equipment. Operator error incidents were omitted. Of the 22 incidents, 2 incidents were on touchscreens, 8 incidents were in relation to the scanners, 1 incident involved a memory pack reader, and the remaining 11 incidents involved printers for the touchscreens. A chart is attached detailing the incidents and the responses to those incidents.